Zions First National Bank v. M-K Investment Co. et al : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Zions First National Bank v. M-K Investment Co. et
al : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Paul N. Cotro-Manes; Attorney for Appellants;
John H. Allen; Carl E. Kingston; John G. Marshall; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Zions First National Bank v. M-K Investment Co., No. 18308 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2990
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
A National Association, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
M-K INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
J. 0. KINGSTON, FRANK A. 
NELSON, JR., PAUL W. NELSON, 
and WILLIAM D. MAXWELL, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 18308 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable David B. Dee, Judge 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
Attorney for Appellants, 
Paul W. Nielson and William 
D. Maxwell 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377 
CARL E. KINGSTON 
Attorney for Appellant, 
J. 0. Kingston 
53 West Angelo Avenue 
Post Off ice Box 15809 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
JOHN G. MARSHALL 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Frank W. Nelson, Jr. 
135 South Main 
Terrace Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JOHN H. ALLEN 
RANDALL D BENSON 
Greene, Callister & Nebeker 
Attorneys for Respondent 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
FI l ED 
JUN 10 1982 
~····--------- -- ........... -... ----- -.. ------... .....,. 
Clor~ Sup:emn Court, Ute'9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .. . . . . . . . . . . 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .. . . . . . . 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 
POINT I THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY 
MATERIAL FACT ......... . 
POINT II ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK WAS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOR AS A MATTER 
0 F LAW . . . . . . . . . . . 
CONCLUSION . 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-25-16 ... 
Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-501(1) 
CASES CITED 
E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1974) ... 
Foster v. Knutson, 527 P.2d 1108 (Wash. 1974). 
McCormick v. Levy, 37 Utah 134, 106 P. 660 (1910) .. 
Michigan National Bank v. Marston, 29 Mich. 
App. 99, 105 N.W.2d 47 (1970) ..... 
Olsen v. Valley National Bank of Aurora, 91 
Page 
1 
4 
4 
4 
9 
11 
6 
10 
6 
11 
6 
11 
Ill. App.2d 365, 371, 234 N.E.2d 547, 550 (1968) ...... 11 
Security Leasing Company v. Flinco, Inc. 
23 Utah 2d 242, 461 P.2d 460 (1969) .. 
Starley v. Deseret Foods Corporation, 74 P.2d 
1221 (Utah, 1938) ............. . 
Strevell-Paterson Company, Inc. v. Michael R. Francis, 
6 
. . . . 6 
No. 17598 (Utah, May 12, 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
A National Association, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
M-K INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
J. 0. KINGSTON, FRANK A. 
NELSON, JR., PAUL W. NELSON, 
and WILLIAM D. MAXWELL, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 18308 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 26, 1979, the defendant, M-K Investment Company 
executed a Promissory Note in favor of the plaintiff, Zions 
First National Bank, for the sum of $150,000.00, together 
with interest thereon from March 26, 1979, at the annual percent-
age rate of 2.5% above the prime rate of Zions First National 
Bank. To secure payment of the Promissory Note, the plaintiff 
took an "Assignment of Monies" from M-K Investment Company and 
also required and received Continuing Guarantees of Credit from 
the defendants, J. 0. Kingston, Frank A. Nelson, Jr., Paul W. 
Nielson, and William D. Maxwell, whereby each individual uncondi-
tionally guaranteed prompt payment of the Promissory Note. 
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M-K Investment Company failed to pay the Promissory Note 
according to its terms and the plaintiff brought its action 
against M-K Investment Company and the four guarantors. All of 
the defendants filed Answers and Cross-claims. Subsequently, a 
petition in Bankruptcy was filed in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Utah, naming M-K Investment Company 
as the debtor, thus staying further action against M-K Invest-
ment Company. 
In his Answer to the Complaint, J. 0. Kingston admitted 
there was an unpaid obligation and further admitted his written 
guarantee of that obligation. Similarily, Frank A. Nelson, Jr., 
Paul W. Nielsen, and William D. Maxwell, in their responses to 
the plaintiff's Requests for Admissions, each admitted that there 
was an unpaid obligation owing to the plaintiff and, also admitted, 
in their Answers to the Complaint that they each executed 
guarantees for that obligation. Only the amount of the unpaid 
obligation was contested by the guarantors. That issue was 
resolved at a hearing held before the Court on March 31, 1982, 
and is not an issue on this appeal. 
In their Answers to the Complaint, the defendants, Paul W. 
Nielson and William D. Maxwell, raise, as their only affirmative 
defenses, the following: 
(1) That the plaintiff breached an alleged promise and 
representation to take adequate and full security by either 
waiving such security or by failing to obtain adequate and full 
security in the first place; 
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(2) That the plaintiff, having adequate and full security, 
refused to either foreclose its lien on that security or assign 
the security to the individual guarantors so that they could 
foreclose the lien; 
(3) That the plaintiff received payment of the obligation; 
and, 
(4) That the plaintiff released and discharged one or more 
of the other named defendants without reserving its rights 
against the defendants, Paul W. Nielson and William D. Maxwell, 
thereby releasing them also. 
On December 7, 1981, after completing discovery, the plaintiff 
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. All of the parties filed 
memoranda and affidavits either supporting or opposing the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The matter was heard before the Court on 
January 5, 1982, and, on February 5, 1982, the Court entered a 
Partial Summary Judgment holding each of the individual guarantors 
liable to the plaintiff but refusing to fix the amount of that 
liability because the plaintiff had not adequately established 
the amount of the obligation. 
On March 12, 1982, the plaintiff filed a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment for the purpose of establishing the amount of 
the liability. This matter was heard before the Court on March 31, 
1982, and, on April 1, 1982, the Court entered a Summary Judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff for the principal amount of $150,000.Q( 
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plus $77,977.28 interest through January 5, 1982 and interest 
thereafter at the annual percentage rate of 2.50% above the 
prime interest rate at Zions First National Bank, together with 
$2,500.00 attorney's fees and $84.25 costs. 
The defendants, Paul W. Nielson and William D. Maxwell have 
appealed to this Court, seeking a reversal of the Partial 
Summary Judgment of liability entered by the District Court on 
February 5, 1982. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Essentially, the appellants have raised two questions on 
appeal. 
QUESTION NO. 1: Are there any unresolved issues of fact 
that were material to the District Court's decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff? 
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the District Court err with respect 
to any of its conclusions of law? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE 
AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
The defendants, Paul W. Nielson and William D. Maxwell, 
allege in their brief that the Partial Summary Judgment was 
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improper due to disputed material issues of fact. They speci-
fically point to four purported material issues of fact, First, 
whether the plaintiff was to take, as security for the Promissory 
Note in question, an assignment from M-K Investment Company of 
a real property mortgage. It should be noted at the outset that 
this issue was not raised in the pleadings and was, therefore, 
not properly before the District Court. The District Court would 
have erred if it had denied the plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment because of a purported material issue of fact that was 
not properly before the Court. 
Furthermore, even if the issue of the plaintiff taking an 
assignment of the real property mortgage had been properly 
raised as a defense, the parol evidence rule would prevent the 
defendants from proving an oral agreement by the plaintiff to 
take such an assignment as additional collateral. The plaintiff 
specifically denies representing that it would take an assign-
ment of a real property mortgage. Even if such a representation 
had been made, in order for the defendants to have relied upon it 
as a basis for executing the written guarantees, the representa-
tion must have been made prior to or contemporaneous with the 
execution of the written guarantees. The written guarantees are 
unambiguous. They make no mention of being conditioned on the 
plaintiff's taking an assignment of a real property mortgage. 
For the defendants to admit on one hand that they executed written 
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guarantees that are clearly unconditional, promising prompt 
payment of the indebtedness of M-K Investment Company to the 
plaintiff, and then to allege, on the other hand, that they 
executed the written guarantees only on the condition that the 
plaintiff would take an assignment of a real property mortgage, 
is a blatant contraction. 
Under the parol evidence rule, Utah Code Annotated §78-25-16, 
(P)arole evidence may not be given to change 
the terms of a written agreement which are 
clear, definite and unambiguous. To permit 
that would be to cast doubt upon the inte-
grity of all contracts and to leave a party 
to a solemn agreement at the mercy of the 
uncertainties of oral testimony given by 
one who, in the subsequent light of events, 
discovers that he made a bad bargain. E.A. 
Strout Western Reality Agency, Inc. v. 
Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1974) 
Utah had long recognized that absent fraud, mistake or 
ambiguity, the parol evidence rule bars the admission of evidence 
of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements which are in conflict 
and at varience with a written instrument. See i.e. Security 
Leasing Company v. Flinco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 242, 461 P.2d 460 
(1969); Starley v. Deseret Foods Corporation, 74 P.2d 1221 (Utah, 
1938); and McCormick v. Levy, 37 Utah 134, 106 P. 660 (1910). 
As stated above, the Continuing Guarantees of Credit are 
clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, no mistake or fraud has been 
alleged by any of the defendants. Under the parol evidence rule, 
any evidence of a prior or contemporaneous agreement contradicting 
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the clear language of the written guarantees would be, as a matter 
of law, inadmissable. The alleged representation by the plaintiff, 
to take an assignment of the real property mortgage, would be 
just such an agreement. The individual defendants as principals 
of M-K Investment Company, signed unconditional guarantees in 
order to obtain a loan from the plaintiff. The loan having been 
• made and the defendants having received the benefit of the guaran-
tees, they now seek to vary the terms of those written guarantees 
by alleging they were conditioned on the plaintiff taking an 
assignment of the real property mortgage. Since the parol evidence 
rule prevents the individual defendants from proving at trial 
that the plaintiff made such a representation, the issue of 
whether the plaintiff made the representation was not an issue 
of fact that was material to this lawsuit. 
The second purported material issue of fact is whether 
the plaintiff made a representation that it would look to its 
collateral before looking to the individual guarantors. Again, 
the defendants, Paul W. Nielsen and William D. Maxwell did not 
raise this issue in their pleadings. J.O. Kingston was the 
only defendant to raise this issue, and in his Answers to Plain-
tiff's First Set of Interrogatories, J. O. Kingston stated, 
"this answering Defendant does not now recall any specific con-
versation with any officer of Plaintiff where he was told that 
Plaintiff would look first to the collateral securing the obliga-
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tion." Again, the District Court would have erred if it had 
denied the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment because of 
a purported material issue of fact that was not properly before 
the court. 
Additionally, the parol evidence rule would prevent the 
individual defendants from presenting evidence concerning a re-
presentation by the plaintiff that it would look first to its 
collateral. For the same reasons as discussed above, this 
second purported material issue of fact was not a basis for the 
District Court to deny the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The third purported material issue of fact concerns the 
value of the collateral which the defendants claim the plaintiff 
has lost or impaire~. The issue of whether the plaintiff has 
lost, impaired or waived any of its collateral is a legal issue 
which shall be addressed below. However, simply stated, it is 
the plaintiff's position that since, as a matter of law, it 
has not lost, impaired or waived any of its collateral, the 
factual issue concerning the value of that collateral was not 
material to the lawsuit. 
The fourth and final purported material issue of fact in-
volves what has happened to the proceeds from the various obli-
gations listed in the Assignment of Monies taken by the plain-
tiff as security for its loan to M-K Investment Company. Again, 
it is the plaintiff's position that this issue was not material 
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to the lawsuit, since, as explained below, the plaintiff was 
never legally obligated to look to the Assignment of Monies be-
fore pursuing the individual guarantors. 
A close analy~is of each of the purported material issues 
of fact raised by the defendants, Paul W. Nielsen and William 
D. Maxwel~ clearly shows that there was no genuine issue as to 
any material fact. 
POINT II 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK WAS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOR AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The defendants' final attack on the Partial Summary 
Judgment focuses on the District Court's conclusions of law. 
First, they argue that since the plaintiff did not pursue its 
security before pursuing the individual guarantors, it released 
the individual guarantors, at least to the extent of the value 
of the security. Clearly, this is not the law in Utah. In 
the recent case of Strevell-Paterson Company, Inc. v. Michael 
R. Francis, No. 17598 (Utah, May 12, 1982), this Court addressed 
the same issue and held that where the guarantee in question is 
an absolute guarantee of payment, and not a mere guarantee of 
collection, the guaranteed party need not pursue its remedies 
against the debtor or the security before proceeding directly 
against the guarantor. 
The defendants next argue that the plaintiff failed to perfect 
its interest in its collateral and by so doing has released, 
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surrendered, impaired or otherwise harmed the collateral, thus 
releasing the individual guarantors to the extent of the value 
of the collateral. It is very important to note that, without 
exception, every source of law cited by the defendants in their 
brief deals with a situation where the creditor had actually 
taken security and then released, surrendered, impaired or 
otherwise harmed it. Since the plaintiff never took an assign-
ment of the real property mortgage, and indeed was never obligated 
to do so, all of the law cited by the defendants on this point is 
inapposite as to the real property mortgage. The only question 
is whether the plaintiff has waived any of the collateral which 
it actually did take, i.e., the Assignment of Monies. As stated 
in the plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-501(1) provides: 
When a debtor is in default under a security 
agreement, a secured party has the rights 
and remedies provided in this part and ex-
cept as limited by subsection (3) those pro-
vided in the security agreement. He may 
reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or 
otherwise enforce the security interest by 
any available judicial procedure. If the 
collateral is documents the secured party 
may proceed either as to the documents or as 
to the goods covered thereby. A secured 
party in possession has the rights, remedies 
and duties provided in Section 70A-9-207. 
The rights and remedies ref erred to in this 
subsection are cumulative. (Emphasis added) 
"(T)he intent of the code was to broaden the options open to a 
creditor after default rather than to limit them under the old 
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theory of election of remedies." Michigan National Bank v. 
Marston, 29 Mich. App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1970). Discussing 
the rights of a creditor under Article 9 of the Commercial Code, 
an Illinois court stated, "(A) creditor is able to pursue any 
one of a number of remedies against a debtor until a debt is 
satisfied." Olsen v. Valley National Bank of Aurora, 91 Ill. 
App.2d 365, 371, 234 N.E.2d 547, 550 (1968). Additionally, the 
Washington Supreme Court, citing Professor Gilmore, stated, 
"Nothing the secured party may do to collect his debt through 
the process of law courts will operate to destroy his security 
interest ... " Foster v. Knutson, 527 P.2d 1108 (Wash. 1974). 
Therefore, the plaintiff did not waive its security by 
choosing to pursue the individual guarantors rather than choosing 
to foreclose its security interest. The plaintiff has not lost 
its security either for itself or for the benefit of the in-
dividual guarantors. 
The legal issues raised in the appellants' brief were properly 
decided by the District Court and the plaintiff was entitled 
to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of the individual defendants has admitted the existence 
of an unpaid obligation owing from M-K Investment Company to 
the plaintiff. Furthermore, each individual defendant has admitted 
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executing a written guarantee of that unpaid obligation. The 
District Court resolved, as a matter of law, all of the defenses 
raised by the individual defendants and appropriately granted 
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. On appeal, the 
defendants, Paul W. Nielsen and William D. Maxwell claim that 
the Partial Summary Judgment was improper due to disputed 
material issues of fact and erroneous conclusions of law. 
However, as explained above, there was no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the plaintiff was entitled to judgment in its 
favor as a matter of law. 
Zions First National Bank respectfully requests this Court 
to affirm the decision of the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting the Partial Summary 
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
JOHJV H. ALLEN 
p-;orneys for Respondent, Zions 
First National Bank 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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